Dan Sleat is a senior coverage advisor for Russia/Ukraine on the Tony Blair Institute for International Change.
As Ukraine prepares to mark one other Independence Day this Aug. 24, the temper in Kyiv is one in all deep resilience and mounting uncertainty.
Greater than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the battle has now entered a grinding new part — one the place neither victory nor collapse are in rapid sight for both aspect. What’s change into clear, nevertheless, is that the Kremlin has recalibrated, more and more satisfied that even when it might probably’t win outright, it can also’t lose.
This isn’t the battle Russia had deliberate, but it surely’s the battle it has realized to combat: one in all attrition and calculated strain. Moscow believes it has the manpower and financial flexibility to maintain a battle that exhausts each Ukraine and Western allies earlier than it exhausts itself. And until the West shifts its technique to match this actuality of endurance and persistence, there’s a rising danger it may unwittingly play into the Kremlin’s fingers.
That is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s lengthy sport — a battle the place time is the important thing battleground.
Clearly, Putin’s authentic goals haven’t been met. There was no lightning strike on Kyiv, no fast regime change. Ukraine’s state, military and nationwide identification are strained, however they continue to be unbroken. In the meantime, peace negotiations are nonetheless a risk — although a distant one for now, as Moscow rejects Ukraine’s situation that any talks should comply with a ceasefire.
Nonetheless, Russia at present controls roughly 19 % of Ukraine’s territory, together with swathes of the Donbas and a land bridge to Crimea, and it continues to make incremental progress. Its advances, nevertheless, have change into expensive and gradual; the battle has claimed over 1,000,000 Russian lives; and the tempo of preventing is excessive but grinding.
However the Kremlin feels it not wants fast or dramatic territorial growth to keep up its strategic momentum. It want solely maintain going — and wait.
This technique isn’t with out its limits, in fact. When it comes to manpower and navy gear, Russia is going through rising strain. On the present depth of preventing, the nation can seemingly maintain operations into subsequent yr and not using a additional mobilization, however its shortfalls will slowly change into extra acute. Plus, when the time comes, an additional mobilization will not be politically palatable.
The Russian public is already feeling the squeeze of financial pressures, with slowing progress, rising inflation and rates of interest, and biting sanctions. Putin has stored a steadiness between navy wants and civilian consumption thus far, however this steadiness is turning into more durable to keep up.
Subsequent yr, harder selections will comply with.
Inside polling already suggests extra Russians now favor a negotiated settlement than an outright continuation of the battle. And if the Kremlin is compelled to decide on between navy escalation and political stability, there’s a restrict to how far it might be keen to go. Constructing on modelling by the RE:Russia assume tank, current evaluation by the Tony Blair Institute exhibits that if the battle continues as is, Russia is projected to spend extra on military personnel than its federal price range for schooling and well being care mixed.
Regardless, Putin is betting Ukraine will blink first, because the constraints Kyiv faces are very actual: continual shortfalls in 155-milimeter shells, air protection programs and troop rotation capability. All these constraints may be rectified, although.
Regardless of the rising sense many have that the battle is at a stalemate — a static entrance line, a battle for inches not breakthroughs — that notion is incorrect. The Kremlin’s calculations assume Ukraine gained’t be capable of maintain the combat for so long as Russia can, that Western allies gained’t meaningfully scale up their help in time, and that Kyiv will finally must make better concessions to finish the battle.
This isn’t a plan for victory, it’s a wager on exhaustion. And it’ll proceed to work, until that logic is damaged.
Ukraine can name Putin’s bluff on with the ability to stick it out, but it surely wants assist to take action. If Western policymakers can match Russia’s technique of endurance with one in all scale and dedication, they’ll shift the steadiness. On this regard, European efforts are lastly ramping up, however they’re not but on the velocity or scale required to make a tangible impression.
What Ukraine wants is depth and sturdiness — instruments for sustained operations over time and throughout terrain. The main target right here shouldn’t simply be on high-profile programs like F-16s — although they undoubtedly assist — however on actual sport changers. This implies: Infantry preventing autos and tanks for mobility and offensive operations; a gentle pipeline of 155-milimeter shells; the mass manufacturing and deployment of drones, for each surveillance and strikes; superior engineering gear to breach Russia’s defensive traces; and a strengthened logistics spine to help maneuver throughout a number of fronts.
If NATO companions — with U.S. help — can ship these over a sustained interval and at scale, Ukraine may regain the initiative, shifting from restricted positive aspects to sustained offensive operations. Solely then can it impose actual strain and disrupt Moscow’s assumption that point is on its aspect. Any sense of a reputable help bundle past a 12-to-18-month interval would additionally pressure a shift within the Kremlin’s calculus.
So, as Ukraine’s Independence Day approaches, Western leaders should confront a check of their very own: independence from short-termism. Supporting Ukraine on this new part isn’t nearly territory. If the nation is to endure and stand in a greater place a yr from now, it should be robust sufficient and armed sufficient to form the top of the battle by itself phrases.
The current summit in Washington confirmed a united Europe with a need to safe peace for Ukraine on phrases the nation will settle for. If correctly leveraged, this might result in a extra coordinated technique, with the continent working collectively towards a transparent intention.
In 1991, Ukraine gained its independence. In 2022, it defended it. Now, in 2025, it wants additional help to maintain it. That requires greater than guarantees — it calls for sustained help. Now.